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Abstract
We investigate different versions of the minority game, a toy model for
agents buying and selling a commodity. The Hamming distance between
the strategies used by agents to take decisions is introduced as an analytical
tool to determine several properties of these models. The success rate of the
agents in an adaptive version of the game is compared with the rate from a
stochastic version. It is shown numerically and analytically that the adaptive
process is inefficient, increasing the success rate of the unused strategies while
decreasing the success rate of the strategies used by the agents. The agents
do not do as well as if they were forced to use only one strategy permanently.
A version of the game in which the agents strategies evolve is also analyzed
using the notion of distance. The agents evolve into a state in which they
are all using one strategy, which is again the state that yields the maximum
success rate.
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1 Introduction
A market is a network of interactions between agents buying and selling
a commodity [1]. On the one hand, the scarcity or the abundance in the
commodity determines its price, while on the other hand, the price of the
commodity modifies the supply and the demand equilibrium. Consequently,
the variation of the price of the commodity reflects the dynamic of the market.
The internal dynamic of a market is the result of the unrelated actions of
the agents buying and selling. At any one moment in time, agents are either
in the group of sellers or buyers, and agents can expect to profit if they are
in the smaller group. Less sellers implies a higher price and a higher profit
for the suppliers while if the number of buyers is small, the sellers will be
forced to offer low prices to sell the commodity. This is a rough picture of
how the internal dynamic distributes the profits amongst the agents.
Obviously, the agents need to analyze the market’s history to decide on
their future action. This history is included in the market prices or in the
volume of the exchanges. Hence, every agent has a strategy that uses the
past prices of a commodity to predict the future price. In the course of time,
the agents have to modify their strategies or their confidence in their different
strategies to adapt themselves to the market changes. The profit of an agent
will be determined by the success rate of his strategy and the efficiency with
which he adapts to market changes.
The minority game model is a very simple model that mimics the internal
dynamic of the exchange of one commodity. The agents are allowed to buy or
to sell a commodity at each time step and those choosing the smaller group
among buyers and sellers are rewarded a point. The record of which group
won for the past time steps constitutes the history of the system. Agents
strive to maximise the number of points they are awarded. No attempt is
made to model any external factors that influence the market.
In the model, the agents have strategies at their disposal to analyse the
history of the system and to take a decision for the next time step. In this
paper, we introduce the notion of Hamming distance between strategies as
an analytical tool to study different versions of the minority game.
In Sec. 2, the basic features of the minority game model are introduced
with the notion of strategy and Hamming distance between strategies. In
Sec. 3, the success rate of the agents in an adaptive version of the model
is investigated. The difference between the success rate of a strategy and
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the success rate of an agent is outlined. Another non-adaptive version of the
model is also introduced to question the relevance of the adaptive process. It
is shown that if agents are allowed to choose between strategies they do not
do as well as if they were forced to use only one strategy permanently. This
result is confirmed in Sec. 4 where an evolutionary version of the minority
game model [2] is investigated. It is shown that most of the agents evolve
spontaneously towards a state in which they are only using one strategy.
2 The model
The models we consider are different versions of the bar-attendance prob-
lem introduced by Arthur [3] and simplified into a minority game by Challet
and Zhang [4, 5]. Basic to the minority game is an odd number N of agents
having to choose between two sides, 0 or 1, at each time step. An agent wins
if he falls into the minority side. The record of which side was the winning
side for the last m time steps constitutes the history of the system. For a
given m, there are 2m different histories. The 8 different histories for m = 3
are listed in the first column of table 1.
Every agent makes a decision for the next time step according to the
history of the system. To be able to play, an agent must have a strategy that
allows him to make a decision for any of the different histories. The second
and the third columns of table 1 list two possible sets of decisions σ and σ′,
that we will call strategies.
If we compare σ and σ′ component by component, we see that for some
histories they make the same prediction and for others they make opposite
predictions. In this example, the decisions only differ when the history is
000, 011 or 110. The normalized Hamming distance between strategies σ
and σ′,
d =
1
2m
2m∑
i=1
|σi − σ
′
i| (1)
is a measure of the difference between the two strategies. In the example of
table 1, d = 3/8. It corresponds to a time average of the different predictions
of the two strategies, assuming that all the histories are equally likely to
occur. Under this condition, d is the probability that an agent who always
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uses strategy σ will take the opposite decision to an agent who always uses
strategy σ′.
By definition, the distance is a number ranging from 0 to 1. For a given
m, the different distances available are
dn =
n
2m
, for n = 0, 1, 2, .., 2m. (2)
If we choose two strategies at random,
P (d) =
2m!
22m(2md)!(2m(1− d))!
(3)
is the probability that the distance between these two strategies is d. We
refer to P (d) as the distance distribution. This is a binomial distribution
with
d =
1
2
(4)
for the mean value of d. The variance of the distribution is σ2(d) = 2−(m+2).
In what follows, we investigate different versions of the minority game, to
show the relevance of the notion of distance as an analytical tool.
3 Success rates
We first investigate the model introduced by Challet and Zhang [4]. Each
agent has a fixed set of s ≥ 1 strategies at his disposal. These strategies are
chosen at random from all the different possible strategies, multiple choices
of the same strategy are allowed. At each time step, every agent chooses one
of his strategies to predict which side will be the minority side. The winning
agents are awarded a point, while the points held by the losing agents do not
change. In addition to giving points to the agents, the strategies also earn
points themselves. A strategy earns a point each time it has forecast the
correct winning side. The points awarded to strategies, called virtual points,
allow an agent to measure the efficiency of all his strategies, irrespective of
whether they were used or not. This measure of the success rate of the
different strategies helps the agents to choose their future strategies.
We distinguish between a determinisitic and a stochastic version for this
model, according to the way an agent chooses his playing strategy. In the
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former, the agents pick the strategy with the highest number of virtual points
while in the latter, they simply choose a strategy at random.
There are two different issues to consider, firstly, that each strategy pos-
sesses an opposite. Consequently, half of the strategies are potentially win-
ning and half of the strategies are potentially losing, irrespective of the num-
ber of agents playing or of the history of the previous days. Secondly, that
there are N = 2k+1 agents and at most k of them can win at each time step.
Hence the probability of picking a winning strategy at random in the strat-
egy space is exactly equal to 1/2 but the average probability that an agent
wins is at most equal to k/(2k+1) < 1/2. These two considerations and the
fact that an agent does not have access to all the strategies means that the
success rate of an agent is different from the success rate of a strategy. The
difference between those two success rates is a measure of the ability of an
agent to choose a performing strategy. We will now investigate the average
success rates of the agents and their strategies for both versions of the model.
First of all, we choose a reference strategy: for the stochastic version, any
strategy is suitable, but for the deterministic version, we choose the strategy
with most virtual points [6]. Then, we assign an integer rank to all the other
strategies: for the stochastic version, the rank r is given to all the strategies
at distance dr = r/2
m from the reference one. For the deterministic version,
we give rank 0 to the strategy with the most virtual points and rank r to
the strategy with the (r+1)th largest number of virtual points. Strategies
at the same distance, or with the same number of virtual points are given
the same rank. We will assume that a strategy that is performing well is not
very different from the best strategy, that is, the one with the most virtual
points. Hence, we assume that the strategies of rank r in the deterministic
version are also the strategies at distance dr = r/2
m from the best one.
The average number of strategies at rank r is simply P (dr). As a result of
these assumptions, we can estimate Nr, the average number of agents using
a strategy of rank r in the next round of decisions. In the stochastic model,
N (stoch)r = NP (dr). (5)
In the deterministic version, an agent uses a strategy of the rth rank only if
he has no strategy of a lower rank. The average number of agents using the
best strategy, N
(det)
0 , is
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N
(det)
0 = N
(
1−
(
1−
1
22m
)s)
, (6)
while the average number of agents using a strategy of rank r > 0, N (det)r , is
N (det)r = N
s−1∑
i=0
s!
i!(s− i)!
(P (dr))
s−i(1−
r∑
j=0
P (dj))
i (7)
also equal to
N (det)r = N((1−
r−1∑
j=0
P (dj))
s − (1−
r∑
j=0
P (dj))
s). (8)
The average distance to the reference strategy is equal to
d =
1
N
2m∑
r=0
Nrdr, (9)
with Nr taking the form of Eq. (5) or (6) and (8) for the stochastic and
deterministic versions of the model respectively. Notice that d ≤ 0.5, with
the equality holding only for the stochastic version of the model.
Suppose now that there are N = 5 (k = 2) agents playing, numbered
from 1 to 5. dij is the distance between the strategies used by agents i and
j. An agent choosing one side wins if at least k + 1 = 3 other agents choose
the other side. The success rate of agent 1, τ (1)ag , defined as his probability to
win a point per time step, is equal to
τ (1)ag = d12d13d14d15 + d12d13d14(1− d15) + d12d13(1− d14)d15
+ d12(1− d13)d14d15 + (1− d12)d13d14d15. (10)
The first term on the right hand side is the probability that agent 1 chooses
one side and the other 4 agents the other side; the 4 other terms on the right
hand side are the probabilities that only one agent chooses the same side as
agent 1. For any other combination of choices agent 1 would lose. This can
be generalized to any number of agents so that the average success rate for
an agent can be expressed as
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τag =
N/2−3/2∑
i=0
(N − 1)!
i!(N − 1− i)!
d
N−1−i
(1− d)i (11)
where we have averaged over all the distances. For the deterministic version
of the model, d is a function of s, but for the stochastic version,
τ (stoch)ag =
(
2N−2 −
(N − 1)!
2(N−1
2
)!2
) 1
2N−1
≃
1
2
− exp
(
1−
1
2
ln(2piN) +Nln
( N
N + 1
))
(12)
where we have put d = 1/2. For the stochastic version of the model, all
the agents are identical and τ (stoch)ag is an estimation of the success rate of the
agents. The numerical and analytical values of τ (stoch)ag are compared in Fig.1a
(two lower curves) for N = 1001 and m = 5. The agreement is excellent.
Notice that the success rate of the agents is independent of s.
For the deterministic version, Eq. (11) gives the success rate of the ref-
erence agent, τ 0ag, which goes to zero very fast as a function of s. According
to our classification, the success rate of an agent of rank r is
τ rag = (1− dr)τ
0
ag + dr(1− τ
0
ag). (13)
which is approximately equal to dr for s ≥ 2. The average success rate of
any agent in the deterministic version is then
τ (det)ag =
1
N
2m∑
r=0
N (det)r τ
r
ag. (14)
This expression is compared to numerical results in Fig.1b (two lower curves)
for N = 1001 and m = 5. The agreement is qualitatively good. The quan-
titative discrepancies probably originate from our assumption that there is
only one strategy with the highest number of virtual points. In fact, we also
showed that in this case, the success rate of this strategy is approximately
0. Hence, most of the time there is more than one strategy with the highest
number of virtual points.
Finally, we consider the success rates of the strategies in both versions of
the model. When a strategy is used, it is in competition with one strategy
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from each of the other agents. Consequently, it has the same average success
rate as an agent. On the other hand, when a strategy is not used, it earns
points only if it can predict the winning side. In the stochastic version,
each side is as likely to be the winning side. Moreover, there are as many
strategies suggesting one side as strategies suggesting the other. Hence, the
average success rate for a strategy in the stochastic version of the model,
τ
(stoch)
st , is
τ
(stoch)
st =
0.5(s− 1) + τag
s
. (15)
In Fig.1a this analytical result is compared with numerical simulations of the
system for N = 1001 and m = 5. There is qualitative agreement between
the two curves.
For the deterministic version, the strategies that are not used have a
greater average success rate than 0.5: they are not used because they differ
from what we called the best strategy, the one with the most virtual points.
But this strategy loses most of the time, as its very low success rate suggests.
The more different a strategy is from the one with largest number of vitual
points, the more likely it is to win. We can express the success rate of the
unused strategies τnust as
τnust =
1
N
2m∑
r=0
N (det)r
∑2m
i=r diP (di)∑2m
i=r P (di)
. (16)
The average success rate of a strategy for the deterministic version is then
equal to
τ
(det)
st =
τnust (s− 1) + τ
(det)
ag
s
, (17)
because at each time step, one strategy is used and s − 1 are not. The
numerical and analytical results for τ
(det)
st are also reported in Fig.1b (two
upper curves) for the same set of values. The two curves are in qualitative
agreement.
If we compare in both models the success rate of the agents and the
success rate of their strategies, the agents seem to make very poor choices.
In a set of strategies of a certain average success rate, the agents always pick
strategies with a success rate lower than the average. In the stochastic model
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this occurs because the unused strategies have a success rate of 0.5 and there
are more unused strategies for greater s. For the deterministic version, the
adaptive process is such that the agents try to concentrate around the same
points in the strategy space. Hence, they are all adaptating in the same way,
making the same predictions and taking the same decisions. This process
is only restricted by the part of the phase space available to the agents.
Consequently, as s increases their performence deteriorates. Conversely, their
adaptive process increases the success rate of the unused strategies instead
of increasing the success rates of the agents. Obviously the problem with the
adaptive process is that every agent is using the same strategy to adapt. To
improve the model, an evolutionary process allowing for selection of efficient
adaptive processes is required. In the next section, we investigate a version
of the minority game model in which the strategies of the agents are allowed
to evolve.
4 The minority game with evolving agents
The second version of the minority game we investigate is a model intro-
duced by Johnson et al. [2]. Every agent i has one strategy at his disposal.
Some agents might share the same strategy. At each time step, each agent
follows the prediction of his strategy with a probability pi, where i denotes
the agent number i = 1, ..., N . The agent takes the opposite decision with a
probability 1−pi. Each time an agent chooses the minority side, he wins and
earns a point. Otherwise, he loses and loses a point. The worst performing
agents are allowed to change their probability pi before the next time step
commences. An agent scoring less than a given lower value L(< 0) chooses a
new probability pi at random from the range [pi −R/2, pi +R/2]. Reflective
boundary conditions are used, but our results do not depend on the particu-
lar choice of boundary conditions. The agent’s score is then reset to 0. The
free parameter R allows one to adjust the persistence with which an agent
sticks to an unsuccessful approach.
We define Q(p)dp as the probability that an agent picked at random
has an associated probability from the range [p − dp/2, p + dp/2]. Hence,
Q(p) is the probability distribution of the probabilities p. We estimate the
probability distribution Q(p) using the notion of distance.
When an agent chooses a new strategy he is said to mutate. As the new
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strategy is choosen from the range [pi−R/2, pi +R/2], the time evolution of
Q(p) is given by
Q(p, t+ dt) = Q(p, t)− S(p, t)dt
+
dt
2
(S(p+∆p, t) + S(p−∆p, t)) (18)
where S(p, t) is the probability that any agent with probability p will mutate
at time t. This can be rewritten as
∂Q
∂t
=
∆p2
2
∂2S
∂p2
(19)
with the normalization condition
∫ 1
0
dpQ(p) = 1. (20)
As ∆p is a measure of the variation of the probability associated with an
agent when this agent mutates, we write ∆p ≃ R/4. If ∆tm(p) is the time
between two mutations for an agent associated with a probability p, the
probability of mutation of this agent is 1/∆tm(p) per time step. Hence,
S(p, t) =
Q(p, t)
∆tm(p)
(21)
on average. We call τ(p) the success rate of an agent with associated proba-
bility p, supposing that this success rate depends only on p. This means that
τ(p) < 1/2. On average, the number of points earned by an agent, C(p, t),
evolves as
C(p, t) = C(p, t0)−
(
1
2
− τ(p)
)
(t− t0). (22)
Applying this equation to t− t0 = ∆tm(p),
∆tm(p) = −
L
1
2
− τ(p)
(23)
because an agent mutates when C(p, t) = L(< 0) and, after mutation, his
points are reset to C(p, t0) = 0. Hence,
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∂Q
∂t
=
R2
32L
∂2
∂p2
((
τ(p)−
1
2
)
Q(p)
)
. (24)
Eq. (24) is a diffusion equation for the probability distribution in the space of
p. The diffusion coefficient, (τ − 0.5)R2/32L, is a function of the position p.
The normalization condition of Eq. (20) corresponds to a mass conservation
law for Q(p). Integrating Eq. (24) with respect to p gives
∂
∂p
((
1
2
− τ(p)
)
Q(p)
)
= 0, (25)
which can be rewritten as
Q(p) =
N0
1
2
− τ(p)
(26)
where N0 is determined by the normalization of Q(p).
We need to estimate the success rate of an agent as a function of p.
Consider first any agent i. He is characterized by his strategy σi and his
probability pi, that is, by the pair (σi, pi). At each time step, he uses σi with
a probability pi and 1− σi with a probability 1− pi. On average, this agent
uses an effective strategy defined as
σeffi = piσi + (1− pi)(1− σi). (27)
Switching to the components, to each 1 in σi corresponds a pi in σ
eff
i , while
to each 0 in σi corresponds a 1 − pi in σ
eff
i . Consider now two agents i
and j characterized by pairs (σi, pi) and (σj , pj) respectively. Comparing the
effective strategies of these two agents component by component, there are
4 possible different realisations of the components, as presented in table 2.
In this table, (σeffi )k is component k of the effective strategy of agent i. If
d is the distance between σi and σj , deff , the distance between the effective
strategies of agents i and j, is
deff = d|1− (pi + pj)|+ (1− d)|pi − pj|. (28)
We call deff the effective distance between (σi, pi) and (σj , pj). To find the
average effective distance between agent i and the other agents, two averaging
processes must be performed. The first one is over d, using the distance
distribution P (d), and gives
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〈deff〉P (d) =
1
2
(|1− (pi + pj)|+ |pi − pj |). (29)
The second average is over the probability distribution Q(pj) and gives
deff(p) =
1
2
∫ 1
0
dpjQ(pj)(|1− (p+ pj)|+ |p− pj |) (30)
where we drop the subscript i from now on. The success rate as a function
of p is then given by
τ(p) =
N/2−3/2∑
i=0
(N − 1)!
i!(N − 1− i)!
d
N−1−i
eff (1− deff )
i (31)
using Eq. (11).
Equations (26), (30) and (31) completely determine τ(p) and Q(p). To
approximate both these quantities, we assume that Q(p) has a uniform dis-
tribution, that is Q(p) = 1 for p between 0 and 1. Eq. (30) gives
deff(p) =
1
2
(1− 2p+ 2p2). (32)
The average effective distance is a maximum at p = 0 and 1 where it is equal
to 0.5. Otherwise, deff < 0.5, achieves its minimum value 0.25 at p = 0.5.
Consequently, the success rate of the agents for p around 0 or 1 is higher
than for p around 0.5. Iterating equations (26), (30) and (31) allows us to
make successive approximations toQ(p). An approximate solution forNQ(p)
after a hundred iterations is presented in Fig.2 with the results of a direct
numerical simulation of the system. We repeated our iterations starting
with a Gaussian distribution, an asymmetric distribution and a parabolic
distribution for Q(p). These all converged to the same result for the set of
parameters presented at Fig.2. In fact, only 2 or 3 iterations were enough to
reach a stationary distribution. As Fig.2 illustrates, the agreement between
the numerical iteration of the analytical results and the direct numerical
simulation of the model is very good.
It is interesting to note that most of the agents are associated with a
probability near 1 or 0. Such agents use only one strategy most of the time,
either their own or the opposite one, respectively. This conclusion compares
with the conclusion of the previous section. In fact, it was shown that if the
agents are allowed to choose between strategies they do not do as well as
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if they were forced to use only one strategy permanently. In the adaptive
model of the previous section, the agents were not able to recognize this
fact and performed badly. In the evolutionary model we investigated in this
section, the agents are able to recognize this and most of them evolved to a
state where they were using only one strategy. Hence, a generalization of this
evolutionary model seems to be the solution of the problem of the adaptive
model.
5 Conclusions
We have shown how the Hamming distance between strategies is a useful
tool to investigate the properties of the minority game. It is a measure of the
difference between two strategies and corresponds to a time average of the
different predictions of these two strategies, assuming that all the histories are
likely to occur. We successfully applied this notion to compute the average
success rate of the agents in different versions of the minority game. For every
version, the analytical results were complemented by appropriate numerical
simulations.
In an adaptive version of the model, the difference between the success
rates of the used and unused strategies was emphasized. It was shown that
the adaptation process is ineffective, increasing the success rate of the unused
strategies instead of the success rate of the strategies used by the agents. In
fact, if the agents were forced to use one strategy permanently, they would
do better. To illustrate this conclusion, the adaptive model was compared
to a stochastic version of the minority game. It was shown that adaptive
agents having a set of s strategies at their disposal perform worst than agents
taking decisions according to a strategy chosen a random at each time step
among the same set of strategies. Our analytical results suggest that the
problem with the adaptive process is that every agent is using the same fixed
mechanism to adapt. As an improvement, we suggest it would be interesting
to let the method used by agents to select strategies evolve. Consequently,
a version of the minority game in which the agents strategies evolve was
investigated.
In the evolving version of the model, the agents have only one strategy,
and its opposite, at their disposal. It was shown numerically and analyti-
cally that most of the agents spontaneously use only one of these strategies.
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Hence, in this version of the minority game as well as in the previous adaptive
version, an agent benefits from always using the same strategy. In the adap-
tive version of the game, agents do not realize this, in the evolving version,
the agents evolve to this state. We proposed that a simple generalization of
this model will improve the efficiency of the adaptive process.
As a corollary, let us mention the work of Cavagna [7], who claims that the
only relevant parameter for the memory is the value ofm, not the information
contained in the memory. In fact, all our results are obtained using only
geometrical considerations, supporting this conclusion.
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Table 1
data σ σ′
000 1 0
001 1 1
010 0 0
011 0 1
100 1 1
101 1 1
110 0 1
111 0 0
Table 2
(σeffi )k (σ
eff
j )k |(σ
eff
i )k − (σ
eff
j )k|
pi pj |pi − pj |
1− pi pj |1− (pi + pj)|
pi 1− pj |1− (pi + pj)|
1− pi 1− pj |pi − pj |
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Table Captions
Table 1 — The first column lists all the possible histories of the system for
the last three time steps (m = 3). A strategy is a set of decisions for all the
different possible histories. Two example strategies σ and σ′ are shown in
the second and third columns.
Table 2 — The first two columns list the 4 possible realisations of the
components of the effective strategies of two agents characterized by pairs
(σi, pi) and (σj , pj). (σ
eff
i )k is component k of the effective strategy of agent
i. The last column gives the different possible contributions to the calculation
of the effective distance.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1 — Analytical results (line) and numerical simulations (line and
crosses) for the success rates of the agents and their strategy for (a) the
stochastic and (b) the deterministic versions of the model; the two upper
curves are the success rates of the strategies and the two lower curves are the
success rates of the agents, for both (a) and (b). The choice of the parameters
is N = 1001 and m = 5. 40 simulations were done over 500 time steps.
Figure 2 — Comparison of the analytical (line) and numerical (line and
crosses) results for NQ(p), the average number of agents with a probability
p, for N = 101, m = 3, L = −4 and R = 0.2. The results of the direct
numerical simulation are obtained after 200 simulations of 106 time steps.
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